transnational economic, ideational and institutional pressures, which spillover into their management of inter-governmental relations. Different empirical referents of hard convergence might encompass fiscal coordination (Dyson, 2014) , technical norms (Borraz, 2007) , policy conditionality, conformity to new trans-national policy instruments (Gilardi, 2005) , respect for formal democratic and market norms by the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or the external imposition of tough performance indicators by these international organisations (Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre, 2010) . What indicators would we use as a proxy of hard convergence? The Europeanisation of budgetary policy would provide one reasonable proxy, as would the impact of the post-2008 economic crisis on local fiscal autonomy. The relationship between economic crisis and territorial governance is thus interpreted as a contender for hard convergence, as is a certain form of Europeanisation.
Soft convergence is better captured in terms of institutional mimetism or looser pressures towards emulation and policy transfer. In our framework, 'soft convergence' involves a more or less conscious effort to import tools or instruments, copy institutions or policies or, at a minimum, refer to a common stock of ideas, or transnational models that have demonstrated their worth elsewhere (Rose, 1991; Evans and Davies, 1999; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) . How would we confirm a soft convergence hypothesis? The highest level of proof would be that of institutional isomorphism (copying institutions), or policy learning (copying policies); a weaker, yet probably more realistic, approach is to identify whether there are similar perceptions of policy challenges in cognate panels in European regions, irrespective of their regional or national context. Evidence is provided later in the article to support this second position.
Two versions of a divergence hypothesis are now presented: the soft (mainly constructed) and the hard (material). In our typology, soft divergence focuses on a specific type of cognitive or interactional mechanism whereby organizations and institutions construct themselves against perceived negative models. The identification of 'negative' lesson drawing is well established in the policy learning literature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1991; Stone 1999) . How would we confirm a soft divergence hypothesis? Ideally, by engaging in longitudinal process tracing over a more or less sustained period of time; and identifying the role of 'outsiders' in specific territorial action repertoires. Answering this question assumes the capacity to provide longitudinal responses, based on a diachronic mode of investigation, favouring thick description on the basis of individual case studies. Such an endeavour lies beyond the present exercise, though it has been applied to individual regions in our sample elsewhere (Cole and Pasquier, 2015; Cole and Stafford, 2015) . Hard divergence is understood in terms of the 'non-comparable' regional and locality factors (demographic, geographical, legal, economic, political) that drive or maintain divergence in particular places. Policy divergence is driven by these territory-specific factors and the scope of choice available to actors is constrained. Keating (2002, p.13) , for example, identified
Welsh language policy and community relations to be exemplars of 'non-comparable' policies within the UK context.
--- Table 1 around here --- Table 1 summarizes the comparative theoretical framework. Two main axes can be identified in the Table: convergence and divergence (mainly referring to results, but also involving varying degrees of strategic choice); and top down and bottom up (as processes). The four positions identified in our typology are more ('soft') or less ('hard') receptive to human agency. Hard convergence and divergence are best explained by material variables (economic indicators, institutional pathways, legal orders, locality factors), which create tensions, sometimes evolve in opposing directions and require individual or collective level interventions. 'Soft' convergence and divergence allow more room for human agency, specifically strategic choices and forms of discursive legitimisation. The two axes are linked by an intervening variable that we label as voluntary versus constrained. The common thread between the two axes is the degree to which actors make a voluntary and deliberate decision to converge or diverge.
Processes of hard and soft convergence and divergence are likely to operate in distinctive ways depending upon whether inputs, outcomes, processes or institutions are considered. Pressures of international ranking and rating, tougher EU budgetary rules, enhanced central steering and tighter controls on public expenditure represent a theoretically credible move in the direction of a convergence of inputs, and, more tangentially, outcomes.
Hard convergence arguments are theoretically less convincing in terms of processes and institutions. The various 'new institutionalisms' emphasize path dependency (historical), logics of appropriateness (sociological) or framing (discursive) as elements of institutional endogeneity (Hall and Taylor, 1997 , Steinmo, 2008 , Schmidt, 2011 . Formal process or network-based accounts highlight actor-configurations and practices that are unlikely to be replicated irrespective of context (Lazega, 2007) .
If it is to take into account the mix of material and constructed elements present within the states of convergence framework, the central hypothesis needs to accommodate a logic of causality and a logic of contingency. In a broad-brush manner, a logic of causality might take two rather different forms. In the pure hypothetical deductive tradition of variable-based comparisons, convergence and divergence are best understood as results. The main analytical challenge is to identify a preferred order amongst several competing independent variables that might explain variation. Such an approach is not particularly suited to the preferred comparative case study, which requires more interpretative depth and which favours theory building over formal modelling. A rather more subtle form of causality is that theorised by Tilly (2001) , whereby causal mechanisms are interpreted in terms of 'partial causal insights' rather than context averse Covering Laws.
Both versions of causality can indicate the direction of change. The central hypothesis (engaging with the normative Europeanisation and political economy literatures referred to above) is that converging pressures, and in particular budgetary retrenchment and the requirements of normative Europeanization, have been intensified by the context of the fiscal and sovereign debt crisis since 2008. The clear variation in our types of region allows institutional and monetary policy differences to be taken into account. The direction of change is one of diminishing territorial capacity. Europeanisation has produced a lessening of divergence in legal systems and in the provenance of much public policy and, in most cases, has strengthened the instruments of central oversight.
Contingency is explicitly embraced insofar as process is concerned. Converging pressures do not necessarily produce converging outcomes or outputs (Radaelli, 2005) . The logic of causality needs to be supplemented by the logic of contingency. Within their own interpretive worlds, territorial actors operate as facilitators of convergence, or prophets of divergence. Direct causalities are much more difficult to establish within such a contingent approach: whether regularities exist or not is a manner of sustained empirical investigation and comparison. Herein lies the importance of theorising on the basis of comparable socialdemocratic regions. Drilling down, we expect broadly similar challenges to be identified by decision-makers in our cognate regions in a period of economic crisis.
CASE SELECTION
The empirical data underpinning this article is focused mainly on sustained empirical investigation of sub-national governments and governance communities in four social and had risen to the 7 th or 8 th most prosperous French region by the turn of the century (Cole, 2006) . By the time of fieldwork in 2013, however, Brittany's position in the informal hierarchy of French regions was declining. Wallonia was traditionally Belgium's heavy industry region; for over three decades it has been engaged in a painful process of economic and industrial restructuring, symbolised by the downsizing of the steel industry (involving massive lay-offs by Arcelor-Mittal and the closure of one site) and by the downturn in the automobile sector (Reid and Musyck, 2010; interviews) . Though Wales attracted a wave of foreign direct investment in the 1980s and 1990s, the region has suffered from the exit of footloose capital (Sony, LG, Toshiba), as well as the painful closure of the coal mines and reduction of steel capacity (Pickernell, 2011 Third, all four are traditionally pro-European regions, or at least regions benefiting from substantial EU investment. Wales has benefited from massive investment through EU structural funds; West Wales and the Valleys have had the highest level of assistance for the past 3 rounds (2000-2006; 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 were less striking for Brittany, with no specific priority objective since 2000 (Pasquier, 2012 These regions have variable degrees of decentralised authority, however, ranging from full 'reserved' legislative powers in Wales, a specific statute in Andalucía that confers a mix of primary and subordinate legislative powers on the Autonomous Community and a general administrative competency in Brittany (along with a de facto co-decision of EU funding decisions). The case is complicated by the institutional mosaic in Wallonia, where regional legislative authority is divided between the francophone community (FWB) for matters of education and culture, and the Wallon regional council for most other competencies.
The EU context provides the core similarity between these regions: all belonging to European Union states. Three of the four regions belong to states that participate in the euro and are signed up to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). The
European variable provides for similarity, but also for variation, insofar as Wales does not form part of the Eurozone.
Finally, each region displays aspects of the 'non-comparable' differences that are the core of our fourth position. The strategies of regional elites, the functioning of the party system, the content of territorial narratives and repertoires are each contextually embedded and represent place specific divergences. Analytically, notwithstanding their real differences, a case might be made for recognising family resemblances between these regions. From a territorial politics perspective, we refer to Wales, Andalucía and Wallonia in particular as second order strong identity regions because they have had to adapt to the overarching presence of a more powerful, autonomist-or independence-minded region within the state (Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders), a presence that has encouraged endogenous institutional affirmation 5 . From a political economy perspective, Dyson (2014) contends that sub-national status and power are deeply conditioned by 'stand-alone' fiscal capacity; Wales, Wallonia, Andalucía and Brittany each appear as debtor regions 6 . Notwithstanding their diverse economic trajectories, these regions do not figure very highly up the informal hierarchy of European cities and regions. In the main body of the article, we now present comparative findings in relation to the core research questions of convergence, divergence, the economic crisis and decentralisation.
CONVERGENCES
There are two versions of a convergence hypothesis: hard and soft. The relationship between economic crisis and territorial governance is interpreted in this article as a contender for hard convergence, as is a certain form of Europeanisation. Soft convergence, on the other hand, is better captured either in terms of institutional isomorphism or looser pressures towards emulation and policy transfer.
Has economic crisis recentralised decentralisation?
If the hard convergence hypothesis is robust, then broader exogenous fiscal, economic and political pressures drive domestic policy change. In extreme cases, such as that of Greece, where the Troika (the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank) has intervened directly in domestic institutional arrangements, there would appear to be a clear association between externally imposed efforts at state retrenchment and domestic policy change (Zahariadis, 2012 (Benz, 2007; Vetter, 2010) . In Spain, the economic crisis has produced new budgetary and regulatory controls over the autonomous communities (Sala, 2013; Colino, 2013) . Even in highly decentralised Belgium, the economic crisis has empowered the Belgian central bank in its dealing with the regions and communities. and Spain, public finance remained a highly centralised policy field within the UK during fieldwork; the core block grant mechanism of financing devolution, based on the Barnett formula, affords the Welsh government substantial freedom to determine how money is spent, but very little autonomy is varying rates of taxation (Trench, 2013) .
The case of Belgium, finally, represents an opposing trend in terms of public financial management; once the sixth reform of the State has been fully implemented, the Federal government budget will be limited to servicing the national debt and funding part of social security, with many other functions having been regionalised (Deschamps, 2013) . To ensure the stability of the economic and monetary union of Belgium, the Federal Authority maintains its authority for matters of monetary policy, price policy, policy on competition, income policy and (part of) social security policy. The one key area where the federal and federated units make common cause is in terms of agreeing efforts to be made to reduce the debt (interviews, 2014) . Retaining credibility as a good European player incited the main actors to agree on key measures of budgetary retrenchment; controlling the public debt was experienced less as an intolerable constraint than as a gauge of managerial credibility (Beyer and Bursens, 2013) .
Rather more general analysis of the impact of the economic crisis on the decentralised and devolved forms of government revealed contrasting findings in our regions. Wales and Wallonia, in rather different ways, were tied up with endogenous programmes of state reform, and socio-economic issues of economic crisis were given less saliency than in either Even in the Belgian case, fieldwork suggested diminishing enthusiasm for the Europe of the Regions. Against this general conclusion, some distinctions can be drawn, the most obvious of which is between: Spain and Belgium, whose regions were at the forefront of attempts at budgetary discipline, and Brittany and Wales, somewhat further removed. We conclude provisionally that the economic crisis is producing tensions between the EU, central governments and this sample of social-democratic regions. This conclusion invites a reinterpretation of the existing literature on territorial governance and Europeanisation.
Studies of the impact of European integration on regions have typically been articulated in the language of multi-level governance, an approach that usually sustains a decentralisation narrative in the broader context of Europeanisation (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Piatonni, 2010 (Börzel, 2002; Ladrech, 2010) . The above survey suggests that the economic crisis has reduced the space available for strategic Europeanisation and enhanced the constraints of normative Europeanisation, experienced by three of our four regions in terms of the constraints of the revised Stability pact, the new budgetary treaty, the new European fiscal architecture and the rules of competition policy. Stand-alone fiscal autonomy was weakened and traditions of public service delivery and public investment were threatened, even in traditionally unconditional Belgium. In these social-democratic regions, 'neo-liberal' hard convergence was experienced as a weakening of political capacity, even when (in the Belgian and Spanish regions) Brussels was not directly targeted.
Soft convergence
In our framework, 'soft' convergence involves a more or less conscious effort to import tools None of our regions comfortably fitted the NPM model, however. In Brittany, the Breton model of cross-partisan consensus was based on negotiated compromises rather than binding targets (Pasquier, 2012) . In Andalucía, the available evidence suggests that regional agencies have been captured by political parties and involve clientelistic politics by other means (Robles-Egea and Aceituno-Montes, 2013). In Wales, new public management ideas of competition, arms-length agencies or the private management of public goods, defined as being against the constitutive beliefs of Welsh (and to a lesser degree Scottish) devolution, had difficulty in gaining legitimacy (Cole and Stafford, 2014) . The strongest case is that of Belgium, where policy learning played an important role in the circulation of managerial models between Flanders, the Federal Authority and Wallonia, following the Copernicus reforms of the 1990s. In contrast to both Flanders and the Federal Authority, French-type legalistic mechanisms initially hampered the introduction of managerial reforms in Wallonia, but the French-speaking part of the country has moved gradually towards modernization since the decade 2000 as a result of economic investments (the so-called Marshall Plan) and EU funding (Brans, de Visscher and Vancoppenolle, 2006; de Visscher and Montuelle, 2010) 11 . In at least three of the four cases, however, there was only limited convergence of form; less a case of institutional isomorphism, in short, than one of instrumental endogenisation of cross-national fashions.
Our actor-focussed approach nonetheless facilitated the identification of soft convergences between our regions, as gauged in responses to a common question asking interlocutors to identify the three principal challenges over the next five year period. Beyond regional specificities, five common challenges emerged, irrespective of state type. In order of priority, these concerned: unemployment, and especially youth unemployment; economic reconversion and the adaptive capacity of established territorial models; education and the levels of basic skills; political decentralisation, its challenges and opportunities, and, finally, the preservation of public services. In each region, there was soul-searching about the capacity of existing territorial models to cope with economic crisis, the challenges of (industrial and agricultural) reconversion and high unemployment. There was a general acceptance that the levers of macro-economic policy escaped the control of regional decision-makers. These social-democratic regions all identified the preservation of public services (especially health and education) as core to preserving their own territorial model. There was not much evidence of bilateralism making a difference in our other three regions.
In Andalucía, comparators were within Spain, with few reference points elsewhere. The overview of our four regions thereby provided some evidence of indirect crossnational learning, but much less evidence of interaction-based learning and agent-based policy transfer.
Members of the

DIVERGENCES
Two versions of a divergence hypothesis were presented in the introductory section: the soft (mainly constructed) and the (mainly material) hard.
Soft divergence, in our typology, is mainly of the constructed variety; actors choose to pursue a divergent policy. It focuses on a specific type of cognitive or interactional mechanism whereby organizations and institutions define themselves against perceived negative models. One part of our empirical investigation sought to establish whether actors reasoned in terms of a territorial model or repertoire (Breton, Welsh, Andalucían, Wallon) as comprising a shared set of understandings, practices and identified adversaries 13 . In Andalucía and Brittany, soft divergence (in its 'constructed' form) is one dimension of the territorial repertoire. Our survey in Brittany uncovered a tried, tested and challenged territorial model that proved its worth in terms of obtaining scarce resources from central government, while proclaiming resentment of the 'Jacobin' logic of centralisation (Cole and Pasquier, 2015) . The Andalucían government also uses identity markers to promote claims in
Madrid, but the Spanish region was less capable of sustaining a territory wide discourse, more tied into traditional partisan and centre-periphery cleavages, low trust and the east-west and perceived heavy handed inspection regimes and health, specifically the creation of foundation hospitals and the purchaser-provider split (Greer, 2007) . In the field of public services reform, while England introduced hard edged, top down performance regimes, policy makers in Wales preferred 'partnership' between central and local government (Andrews and Martin, 2010) . The devolved administration in Wales also rejected the involvement of private firms and finance in providing and investing in public services, refusing the use of the Private Finance Initiatives used extensively in England to build new hospitals. There were, arguably, sound political logics to each of these decisions. But were officials discouraged from drawing positive policy lessons from English experience under the broad steer to develop 'Made in Wales' policies? The evidence, though inconclusive, suggests this to be the case 16 . Post-devolution Wales provides a critical case which suggests that processes of ideational institutionalisation are especially strong at the early phase of organisational foundation.
In Table 1 , hard divergence was identified by the persistence of what Keating (2002) labels as the 'non-comparable' regional and locality factors (demographic, geographical, legal, economic, political). Place-specific contexts (national, regional, local) are key to understanding divergence. This contextual relativist position produces two rather different levels of analysis: first, the broad brush approach represented by contrasting state clusters and regime types; second, drilling down into more precise material, structural, institutional, regional and local explanatory factors.
In their work on sub-national democracy in Europe, Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidstrom (2010) identify state traditions as independent variables that are compared across 27 countries and mobilised to explain variations in subnational democracy. Page and Goldsmith (1987) provided the classic distinction of northern and southern families of European sub-national experience. They contrasted countries with Napoleonic traditions like France, Spain and Italy, with their strong states and weak local government from the functionally stronger local governments in states like Sweden and England. In their more recent comparative study, Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidstrom (2010) Moving down a level of analysis, arguments based on hard divergence are also supported by structural and institutional arguments: specifically, by variable political opportunity structures, by the operation of party systems, by the continuing influence of national administrative pathways and legal traditions.
Prevailing political opportunity structures strongly influence the form of the party system in general, and of territorially specific party dynamics in particular. In three of our four regions (at least), the period observed a revival of territorial identity forms of collective action. In Brittany, the 'red bonnet' protests of 2013 mixed territorial identity markers (flags, language, specific practices, such as sabotage), with appeals to solidarity with a spatially peripheral region in crisis. In Andalucía, the reference to latifundism and land reform remained present in the discourse of regional leaders. In Wales, territorial identity markers were expressed notably in the field of language and education. Across our four regions, though we identify distinct configurations of regional influence, only in Wales is the territorial party system is clearly influenced by a powerful ethno-territorial party, Plaid
Cymru. In Brittany and Andalucía, a powerful regional milieu exists: but the weight of territorial lobbies within the national parties or national parliamentary institutions was the real indicator of regional influence. Political opportunity structures provide contrasting incentives in each region. This discussion emphasises that the national level of regulation remains important in at least three of our four cases. Except in Belgium, state structures, party systems and the political rules of the game still make sense nationally -and sometimes regionally as well.
Regional and local factors complete this elucidation of divergences. Place specific identity markers are sometimes directly comparable (Is there a regional language policy? Do regionalist parties prosper?), sometimes not. Each regional policy community operates within specific local traditions. Locality effects might concern the framing of specific agendas and interests, such as the conflict between environmentalists and mass farming in Brittany, for example, or the competition for resources between metropolitan centres and small towns in Andalucía. They might concern issues specific to one or two regions, such as regional language policy (Wales) or the defence of the language more generally (Wallonia).
They might involve regional specificities such as the saliency of religious education in Is there convergence to informal processes? Convergence pressures are never simply implemented according to a trans-national template; they require strategic and discursive choices that lie more squarely within the realm of human agency. The overview of our four regions provided little evidence of interaction-based learning, of agent-based policy transfer or of the emulation of foreign models. Our survey demonstrated substantial soft convergence, however, in relation to the problematisation of regional priorities in a period of economic crisis 17 . Arguments of socio-economic justice were mobilised to justify continuing transfers: for example, the historical debt of Spain towards Andalucía; needs-based arguments in Wales, the region's peripheral status in the case of Brittany; the severe challenges of industrial reconversion in Wallonia. In each case, playing on territorial identity was a useful lever to extract resources in a context of multi-level governance (from central government and the European Union). In each case, the pursuit of socio-economic interests and preservation of existing welfare traditions and financial transfers placed boundaries on using territorial identity to support more autonomous forms of governance. Ultimately, the social-democratic character of these regions (their preference for solidarity and cross-national transfers) was more important than their penchant for more autonomous forms of governance.
Place-specific contexts (national, regional, local) are key to understanding divergence.
Even the hardest macro-constraints can empower the belief in the capacity of specific territorial models to mediate economic crisis. Regional leaders can be craftsmen of divergence and convergence. The ability to transform objective (macro) constraints into subjective (place-specific) opportunities is a measure of underlying territorial political capacity. The overarching claim for all of our cases, however, is that processes identified as those of hard convergence are reducing the domestic capacity of regional actors and challenging the assumptions underpinning territorial action repertoires, whether or not they change patterns of behaviour in the short term. Our interviews revealed a measure of cognitive dissonance: the belief in the capacity of specific territorial models to negotiate change, alongside a broad acceptance that the levers of macro-economic policy escaped the control of regional decision-makers. The Breton and Andalucían cases in particular suggest that economic crisis embeds existing repertoires, confirming Bourdieu's (1980) insight that actors in crisis revert to existing mental maps, or habitus, even when this creates a situation of hysteresis, or the incapacity of existing frames to solve problems. 'Constructed' divergence against negative models.
Actors choose to pursue a divergent policy. 13 Identical questions were asked in each region in relation to the existence (or not) of a regional political culture, the role of parties, intergovernmental relations and the impact of European integration on regional cohesion.
14 The main themes emerging in response to the question on Andalucían political culture.
15 16 interviews were carried out with a specially convened civil service panel in 2010, following up from earlier interviews carried out in 2001-2002. 16 Most interviewees in the 2010 civil service panel refused to be drawn on this, but a couple regretted the obstacles to identifying good practice in England.
